#### **Evolving Cybersecurity Strategies** NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 4

**ISSA National Capital Chapter** 

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NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY

### **Advanced Persistent Threat**

#### An adversary that —

- Possesses significant levels of expertise / resources.
- Creates opportunities to achieve its objectives by using multiple attack vectors (e.g., cyber, physical, deception).
- Establishes footholds within IT infrastructure of targeted organizations:
  - To exfiltrate information.
  - Undermine / impede critical aspects of a mission, program, or organization.
  - Position itself to carry out these objectives in the future.



#### **Unconventional Threats to Security**



Complexity

#### Connectivity





Culture

NIST SP 800-53, Revision 4 Supports A New Cyber Defense Vision Build it right – Continuously monitor




#### The Present

We have our heads under the hood looking at every last detail in the engine compartment—that is, pursuing an endless number of *information system* vulnerabilities...





Instead of trying to figure out what type of car we need that is, what level of information system *resiliency* is necessary to effectively support our core missions and business functions...







### Active Cyber Defense – The Future

- Develop *risk-aware* mission and business processes.
- Develop and implement *enterprise architectures* with embedded information security architectures that support organizational mission/business processes.
- Use information technology *wisely* considering current threat landscape (capabilities, intent, and targeting).
- Develop and implement robust *continuous monitoring* programs.



#### Cyber Defense Vision Core Principles

- Strong, resilient, penetration-resistant information systems supporting core missions / mission processes.
- Ongoing monitoring of the security state of information systems and environments of operation.
- Continuous improvement in security controls.
- Flexibility and agility in cyber security and risk management activities.



### **Fundamental Concepts**


**Developing IT Products and Systems** 

- Modularity.
- Layering.
- Monitoring.

To achieve defense-in-depth and defense-in-breadth.



#### **Enterprise-Wide Risk Management**





#### **Enterprise Architecture**

- Consolidation.
- Optimization.
- Standardization.




And the integration of information security architecture...

Reduces the size and complexity of IT infrastructures, promotes good cyber security and privacy, and can potentially lower costs (significantly) for organizations.



# Architectural and Engineering Approach



## Build It Right – RMF Steps 1, 2, 3

#### **Starting Point**

#### ▶

#### MONITOR Security Controls

Continuously track changes to the information system that may affect security controls and reassess control effectiveness.

**AUTHORIZE** 

**Information System** 

Determine risk to organizational

operations and assets, individuals,

other organizations, and the Nation;

if acceptable, authorize operation.

#### CATEGORIZE Information System

Define criticality/sensitivity of information system according to potential worst-case, adverse impact to mission/business.



#### SELECT Security Controls

Select baseline security controls; apply tailoring guidance and supplement controls as needed based on risk assessment.

#### Security Life Cycle

#### IMPLEMENT Security Controls

Implement security controls within enterprise architecture using sound systems engineering practices; apply security configuration settings.

#### ASSESS Security Controls

Determine security control effectiveness (i.e., controls implemented correctly, operating as intended, meeting security requirements for information system).



### Highlights of SP 800-53 Update



### Major Drivers for Update

- Current threat landscape.
- Empirical data obtained from cyber attacks.
- Gaps in coverage in current security control catalog.
- Insufficient attention to security assurance and trustworthiness.
- Need for additional tailoring guidance for specific missions, technologies, and environments of operation.



### Gap Areas Addressed

- Insider threat.
- Application security.
- Supply chain risk.
- Security assurance and trustworthy systems.
- Mobile and cloud computing technologies.
- Advanced persistent threat.
- Tailoring guidance and overlays.
- Privacy.

### **Control Family Labels**

Eliminated management, operational, and technical labels on security control families—

ID	FAMILY	CLASS
AC	Access Control	Technical
AT	Awareness and Training	Operational
AU	Audit and Accountability	al
СА	Security Assessment and Authorization	Ma ent
СМ	Configuration Management	Ope.
СР	Contingency Planning	Opera
IA	Identification and Authentication	Technica
IR	Incident Response	Operation
MA	Maintenance	Operational
MP	Media Protection	Operational
PE	Physical and Environmental Protection	Operation
PL	Planning	Manager
PS	Personnel Security	Operat
RA	Risk Assessment	Man ent
SA	System and Services Acquisition	Mr ment
SC	System and Communications Protection	
SI	System and Information Integrity	Operational
PM	Program Management	Management

# Expanded Tailoring Guidance

- Identifying and designating common controls in initial security control baselines.
- Applying scoping considerations to the remaining baseline security controls.
- Selecting compensating security controls, if needed.
- Assigning specific values to organization-defined security control parameters via explicit assignment and selection statements.




# Expanded Tailoring Guidance

- Supplementing baselines with additional security controls and control enhancements, if needed.
- Providing additional specification information for control implementation.



## **Tailoring the Baseline**



Document risk management decisions made during the tailoring process to provide information necessary for authorizing officials to make risk-based authorization decisions.



# Overlays

Overlays complement initial security control baselines—

- Provide the opportunity to add or eliminate controls.
- Provide security control applicability and interpretations.
- Establish community-wide parameter values for assignment and/or selection statements in security controls and control enhancements.
- Extend the supplemental guidance for security controls, where necessary.




# Types of Overlays

- Communities of interest (e.g., healthcare, intelligence, financial, law enforcement).
- Information technologies/computing paradigms (e.g., cloud/mobile, PKI, Smart Grid).
- Industry sectors (e.g., nuclear power, transportation).
- Environments of operation (e.g., space, tactical).
- Types of information systems (e.g., industrial/process control systems, weapons systems).
- Types of missions/operations (e.g., counter terrorism, first responders, R&D, test, and evaluation).



#### Assurance and Trustworthiness



Enables Understanding of Security Capability

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## Minimum Assurance – Appendix E

- Appendix E has been completely revised and reworked.
- The minimum required assurance is provided by implementation of the appropriate baseline set of controls.
- The assurance-related controls for each baseline are provided in tables E-1, E-2, and E-3.
- Additional assurance-related controls are provided in table E-4, i.e., assurance-related controls not in any baseline.

	ID	CONTROLS	ID	CONTROLS
Table E-1 -	AC	AC-1	MP	MP-1
Minimum	AT	AT-1, AT-2, AT-3, AT-4	PE	PE-1, PE-6, PE-8
Assurance	AU	AU-1, AU-6	PL	PL-1, PL-2, PL-4
	CA	CA-1, CA-2, CA-3, CA-5, CA-6, CA-7	PS	PS-1, PS-6, PS-7
for Low	СМ	CM-1, CM-2, CM-8	RA	RA-1, RA-3, RA-5
Impact	СР	CP-1, CP-3, CP-4	SA	SA-1, SA-2, SA-3, SA-4, SA-5, SA-9
Baseline	IA	IA-1	SC	SC-1, SC-41
Baconno	IR	IR-1, IR-2, IR-5	SI	SI-1, SI-4, SI-5
	MA	MA-1		



## **Privacy Control Families**

- Authority and Purpose (AP)
- Accountability, Audit, and Risk Management (AR)
- Data Quality and Integrity (DI)
- Data Minimization and Retention (DM)
- Individual Participation and Redress (IP)
- Security (SE)
- Transparency (TR)
- Use Limitation (UL)



# **Policy Changes**

#### OMB 2011 FISMA Reporting Guidance, *Memorandum-11-33*

<u>http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2011/m11-33.pdf</u> Question #28

- "28. Is a security reauthorization still required every 3 years or when an information system has undergone significant change as stated in OMB Circular A-130? No. Rather than enforcing a static, three-year reauthorization process, agencies are expected to conduct ongoing authorizations of information systems through the implementation of continuous monitoring programs. <u>Continuous monitoring programs thus fulfill the three year security reauthorization requirement, so a separate reauthorization process is not necessary</u>......"
- Follow guidance consistent with NIST Special Publication 800-37, Revision 1.

Bottom Line: Rather than enforcing a static, every-three-year reauthorization process, agencies are expected to conduct ongoing authorizations of information systems through the implementation of continuous monitoring programs.



### **Continuous Monitoring**

- Determine effectiveness of risk mitigation measures.
- Identify changes to information systems and environments of operation.
- Verify compliance.

Bottom Line: Increase situational awareness to help determine risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.



#### Focus Areas — 2012 and Beyond

- NIST Special Publication 800-30, Revision 1 Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments
- NIST Special Publication 800-160 Security Engineering Guideline
- Update to NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations
- Update to NIST Special Publication 800-53A, Revision 2 Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations



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