

# MACINTOSH FORENSICS IN 90 MINUTES

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**June 18, 2019**

**Loosely based on:**  
**CFRS 764 - Mac Forensics**  
**Spring 2019**



*All images from Wikipedia unless otherwise noted*



**ISSA**  
Information Systems Security Association  
**National Capital Chapter**



# Online for tonight's talk

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## **Introduction**

- GMU CFRS 764 — Mac Forensics
- History of MacOS
- What makes the Mac different

## **Mac Forensic Opportunities**

- Unix/Linux/Windows forensic techniques that work on the Mac
- Mac-specific collection opportunities

## **Mac Forensic Challenges**

- Pervasive cryptography and Apple's "T2" chip
- APFS
- Mac logging

## **Mac Forensic Tools**

- Open Source
- Proprietary

# CFRS 764 — Mac Forensics

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## Overview

- “Presents students with the concepts, tools, and techniques used for forensic analysis of the Macintosh based computers. Classes will consist of lectures on the Macintosh operating system, reverse engineering, forensic practice and research, followed by exercises conducted in a lab environment.”

**—REVISED FOR 2019!**

**Spring 2019 • Wednesday 7:20 – 10:00pm**

**Spring 2020 • Thursday 4:30 – 7:10pm (tentative)**



# There's a lot to Mac Forensics!

## (Overview of CFRS 764)

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- Course Overview/Administrative Items; History; Encryption
- Live System Analysis: Stored Data, Log files and File Structures
- Live System Analysis: The Storage Layer, Disk Partitioning and Mac Filesystems
- Disk imaging and working with disk images.
- Live System Analysis: Processes, Network Connections, and other stuff
- Memory Analysis: Memory Capture and Volatility.
- Users Directory Artifacts Analysis
- Using dtrace
- System and Global Artifacts Analysis
- Isolation
- iOS, iTunes, and iCloud Contributions
- Recent Research in Mac Forensics
- Final presentations and Exam Prep

# A bit about me\*

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Photo Credit: Declan Mccullough

**Simson L. Garfinkel, Ph.D.**

**<https://simson.net/>**

**[simsong@acm.org](mailto:simsong@acm.org)**

**Interests: Security, Privacy, Digital Forensics**

1987	MIT (Chemistry, Political Science, STS)
1988	Columbia University (MS Journalism)
1995	Vineyard.NET (ISP)
1998	Sandstorm Enterprises (Digital Forensics Tools)
2002-2005	MIT CSAIL (PhD Computer Science)
2006-2014	Naval Postgraduate School (Associate Professor)
2015-2016	National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
2017-	US Census Bureau

\*affiliations are provided for identification purposes only



# This lecture is not about iOS forensics

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**There's a lot of resources for iOS forensics.**

**iOS forensics is significantly different than Mac forensics**

- iOS apps are more restricted than Mac apps
- Macs have more functionality
- Macs have more storage
- MacOS has more history

**macOS is changing faster than iOS**

- Apple is hardening macOS
  - Forensics on the mac is getting harder*
  - Old approaches no longer work*
- Apple is adding more identity information
  - Creates more forensic opportunities*
  - Primarily useful for identity intelligence, not malware analysis*



# A brief introduction to the Mac



History of MacOS  
What makes MacOS different



# Mac History 1984-2001

## System 1 – MacOS 9

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**Macintosh 128K**  
**1984**



**Macintosh II**  
**1987**



**iMac**  
**1998**

### Key distinguishing features:

- Real mode operating system; no memory protection; cooperative multi-tasking.
- Smart peripherals favoring buses: Apple Desktop Bus, SCSI, USB
- Networked (AppleTalk: 1985-2009; TCP/IP: 1988-)
- Highly proprietary (Floppies; File System; etc.)


# MacOS 9 —

## The last classic Mac operating system (1999)

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
### Introduced:

- Apple KeyChain
- Speech synthesis and recognition
- File encryption
- Ran on PowerPC





# NeXT Computer



## **1985 — Founded by Steve Jobs**

- Nine years after Apple

## **1987 — NeXT “Cube”**

## **1988 — NeXTstation (bw & color)**

## **1993 — NeXTSTEP ported to Intel**

## **1995 — ported to SPARC and PA-RISC**

## **1996 — NeXT purchased by Apple for next-generation Mac OS.**



## **Operating system features:**

- Mach microkernel from Carnegie Mellon University
- BSD Unix 4.3
- Display PostScript
- NeXTSTEP Object-Oriented Application Development Environment

## **Hardware features:**

- Large bitmapped display; DSP sound; NeXT desktop bus; integrated laser printer



# macOS X (ne MacOS X, OSX, Rhapsody) 2001-

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## **macOS X is the NeXTSTEP operating system, updated.**


- Mach microkernel (memory management, processes, inter-process communication.)
- BSD kernel (monolithic kernel providing TCP/IP and many system services.)  
—*“XNU Kernel”*
- BSD utilities
- Quartz (ne DisplayPDF)
- OpenStep (ne NeXSTEP)
- APIs for legacy System 7/8/9 apps
- PowerPC and Intel (2005)



## **See also:**

—[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Star\\_Trek\\_project](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Star_Trek_project)

# How all of this fits together



# “Why Macs are Still Better Than PCs”

## Advantages of Macs

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### **Quickview**

### **EMACS keybindings in all text fields**

### **Migration Assistant**

### **Consistent user interface**

### **Startup options, including:**

- Boot from any volume
- Target mode
- Recovery Mode

### **Hardware:**

- Consistently high quality
- Excellent support policies (if you have AppleCare)

[https://simson.net/page/Why\\_Macs\\_are\\_Still\\_Better\\_Than\\_PCs](https://simson.net/page/Why_Macs_are_Still_Better_Than_PCs)



# “Why Macs are Still Better Than PCs”

## Problems with Windows

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### **NTFS is a lousy file system**


- Poor performance*
- Locks open files and directories containing open files*
- Alternate data streams have no legitimate use.*

### **Legacy APIs make development difficult**

### **Process creation is really slow**

### **Windows inter-process messaging is fundamentally flawed**

**... But it's a great platform for writing malware!**



# Today's Mac Hardware Stack

**CPU — Some Intel chip**

**Memory — Matched to the CPU**

**Storage:**

- ATA/SATA/SCSI • USB • SD Card

**Multi-purposes buses:**

- USB • Thunderbolt • PCI • FireWire • Fibre Channel

**Display**


- Direct attached & bus-attached

**Network**

- Ethernet (wired & wireless); WLAN
- Bluetooth

**Other I/O devices (typically bus-attached)**

- Audio
- Camera



# Mac Boot Sequence

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—<https://eclecticlight.co/2018/08/25/booting-the-mac-visual-summary/>

## 1. Mac Power On Self Test (POST)

- If no RAM is found, a single tone repeated every 5 seconds
- If RAM is found but fails POST, three tones followed by 5 second pause, repeating
- Other stuff (see article at <https://eclecticlight.co/2018/08/10/booting-the-mac-loading-boot-efi-and-secure-boot/>)

## 2. Run firmware for all hardware chips, including SMC, T2, NVRAM, audio, USB, storage, Wi-Fi, Ethernet, etc

## 3. Process any special keys that are down

## 4. If firmware password is set, get and validate password (if required)

## 5. Enumerate storage devices and boot device specified in NVRAM.

# Boot the Mac: Special keys

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**Command (⌘)-R - macOS Recovery partition**

**Option (⌥) - Startup Manager (select startup disk or volume)**

**Shift (⇧) — Safe Mode**

**⌥⌘-R — macOS Recovery over Internet**

**⇧⌥⌘R — MacOS Recovery over Internet**

**⌥⌘PR — Reset NVRAM**

**C — Boot from CD/DVD**

**D — Apple Hardware Test or Apple Diagnostics**

**⌥D — Apple Hardware Test over Internet**

**N — Start from NetBoot server (not on T2-equipped computers)**

**⌘S — Single-user mode (macOS High Sierra or earlier)**

**T — Target mode. Make Mac external HD (Firewire or Thunderbolt)**

**⌘V — Verbose**

**X — Boot OSX (instead of Windows)**

**Eject (⏏) or F12 or mouse button or trackpad button — Eject Removable Media**

**Left⇧ — Prevent automatic login**

**Left⇧Control(^)⌥Power (⏻) — Reset SMC**

## Sources:

<https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201255> — Special keys on boot

<https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201236> — Special keys after startup

<https://www.idownloadblog.com/2016/05/23/mac-startup-key-combinations/> — More combinations



# Mac Forensic Opportunities



Existing forensic techniques that work on the Mac

Mac-specific collection opportunities

# What are our options?


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# Existing forensic techniques that work on the Mac

# Mac web browsers are similar to Windows web browsers

## Safari — Default browser on MacOS X & iOS devices



**Today: Chrome 60%, Safari 35%, Firefox 5%**

**Search at <https://netmarketshare.com/browser-market-share.aspx>**



# Safari: per-user databases of web activity. Complete and easy-to-parse (SQLite3)

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## **Safari — \$HOME/Library/Safari**

**AutoFillCorrection**

**Bookmarks.plist**

**CloudAutoFillCorrection**

**ClouTabs**

**Databases for remote web sites**

**History**

**PerSitePreferences**

**Recently Closed Tabs**

**User Notification Permissions**

# Mac-specific collection opportunities

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## **dtrace — allows complex monitoring of most kernel APIs**

- You must disable System Integrity Protection for most uses.
- Better for offline analysis than incident response.

## **fsevents — list of file system “events” on each volume**

- Metadata record of files created, deleted & modified
- Compact data structure, can go back months or years
- Similar to Windows and EXT4 journals, but much more complete
- Largely ignored by current forensic tools
  - BlackLight only parses when an option is selected*
  - Someone has written an Autopsy module; not obviously part of main release*

## **Keychain — A single encrypted database with:**

- Passwords: websites, 802.11, encrypted volumes,
- Client-side certificates for end-to-end encryption
- Secure Notes

# Persistence is similar to other Unix/Linux systems

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## System Boot:

EFI Boot ROM

EFI booter

XNU KernelCache

launchd (init in old Unix)

## Launchd

/Library/LaunchAgents—Per-user agents installed by the admin

/Library/LaunchDaemons—System-wide daemons installed by the admin

/System/Library/LaunchAgents—Per-user agents provided by Apple

/System/Library/LaunchDaemons—System-wide daemons provided by Apple

—*Agents* — loaded upon user login

—*daemons* — loaded at system startup

Note: “*plists*” are used for more than launchd.

# Tools for launching

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## launchctl — for controlling launchd

```
launchctl list
```

```
launchctl load -F plist
```

## crontab — legacy cron control

```
crontab -l
```

```
crontab -e
```

```
crontab -u userid
```

## persistence via kext

```
/System/Library/Extensions — OSX
```

```
/Library/Extensions — 3rd Party software
```

## Other methods:

```
/Library/StartupItems/
```

```
/Library/PreferencePanels
```

```
/System/Library/StartupItems /System/Library/PreferencePanels
```

```
/etc/rc.common
```

```
~/Library/PreferencePanels
```



# Apple's push for integration creates forensic opportunities

Recently I got a new mac mini!









# Welcome

In just a few steps, you can register and set up your Mac.



United States

Afghanistan

Åland Islands

Albania

Algeria

American Samoa

Andorra

Angola

Anguilla



Back



Continue

Do you need to hear instructions for setting up your Mac?


To learn how to use VoiceOver to set up your computer, press the Escape key now.



# Enable Location Services

Location Services allows apps like Maps and services like Spotlight Suggestions to gather and use data including your approximate location.

[About Location Services & Privacy...](#)



☒ Enable Location Services on this Mac



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# Analytics

Help Apple and app developers improve their products and services automatically.



☒ Share Mac Analytics with Apple

Help Apple improve its products and services by automatically sending diagnostics and usage data. Diagnostic data may include location information.

☒ Share crash data with app developers

Help app developers improve their apps by allowing Apple to share crash data with them.

[About Analytics & Privacy...](#)



Back




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# Siri

Siri helps you get things done just by asking. Siri sends information like your voice input, contacts, and location to Apple to process your requests. Siri can also make suggestions before you ask in apps, search, and keyboards.

[About Siri & Privacy...](#)



☒ Enable Ask Siri



Back





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# All your files in iCloud

Keep all the important files on your Mac safely stored and available everywhere.



☒ **Store files from Documents and Desktop in iCloud Drive**

All your files from the Documents folder and the Desktop will automatically upload to iCloud Drive and stay up to date on all your devices.



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Sat 4:22 PM



### Wi-Fi Calling

You can use your phone number to make and receive calls directly on this Mac u...

Not Now

Turn On



### Contacts Password Required

Enter your password for "simsonlgarfinkel" in Internet Accounts.

Close

Continue



### New Accounts Added


You can configure new accounts in Internet Accounts.

Later


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# Time Machine creates a forensic archive!



**No Time Machine**



**Time Machine Activated**

## Check:

`/Library/Preferences/com.apple.TimeMachine.plist`

**Backups don't need to be restored; they can be analyzed directly.**



# Mac Forensic Challenges



System Integrity Protection  
Pervasive cryptography  
Apple's T2 chip  
APFS  
Logging










# Welcome

In just a few steps, you can register and set up your Mac.



United States

Afghanistan

Åland Islands

Albania

Algeria

American Samoa

Andorra

Angola

Anguilla



Back



Continue

Do you need to hear instructions for setting up your Mac?

To learn how to use VoiceOver to set up your computer, press the Escape key now.



# Data & Privacy

This icon appears when an Apple feature asks to use your personal information.

**Apple believes privacy is a fundamental human right, so every Apple product is designed to minimize the collection and use of your data, use on-device processing whenever possible, and provides transparency and control over your information.**

[Learn More...](#)



Back



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# Integrated 2-factor

**Apple ID Sign In Requested**  
**simsong@acm.org**


Your Apple ID is being used to sign in  
to a Mac mini near Arlington, VA.



**Don't Allow**

**Allow**

PANO  
SQUARE  
PHOTO  
VIDEO  
SLO-MO






# Sign In with Your Apple ID

Sign in to use iCloud, iTunes, App Store, iMessage, FaceTime, Find My Mac, and more.

[Set Up Later](#)



A message with a verification code has been sent to your other devices running iOS 10 or macOS Sierra or later. Enter the code to continue.

[Didn't get a verification code?](#)



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# System Integrity Protection



# DTrace is a powerful tool for monitoring a Mac

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**Developed by Sun Microsystems (now Oracle) for Solaris.**

**Operates by:**

- Compiling user-supplied code in dtrace language.**
- Injecting code into the kernel**

**History:**

**2004: Cantrill, Shapiro & Leventhal, “Dynamic Instrumentation of Production Systems,” USENIX ATC**

—[https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/usenix04/tech/general/full\\_papers/cantrill/cantrill\\_html/](https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/usenix04/tech/general/full_papers/cantrill/cantrill_html/)

**2007: Apple ports DTrace to MacOS 10.5; adds Instruments API**

—*Also adds P\_LNOATTACH; prevents DTrace with System Integrity Protection*

**2008: Ported to Linux**

**2019: Microsoft releases for Windows 10 insider build 18342**

# Using DTrace

---

**DTrace requires root privileges.**

**Most scripts won't work if System Integrity Protection is enabled.**

**Enabling SIP requires reboot into single-user mode.**

# Here's what happens if SIP is enabled:

```
$ sudo rwsnoop
```

```
dtrace: system integrity protection is on, some features will not be available
```

UID	PID	CMD	D	BYTES	FILE
dtrace:	error	on enabled	probe ID 26	(ID 168:	syscall::read:return):
invalid	kernel	access in	action #1	at DIF	offset 0
dtrace:	error	on enabled	probe ID 28	(ID 468:	syscall::pread:return):
invalid	kernel	access in	action #1	at DIF	offset 0
dtrace:	error	on enabled	probe ID 28	(ID 468:	syscall::pread:return):
invalid	kernel	access in	action #1	at DIF	offset 0
dtrace:	error	on enabled	probe ID 28	(ID 468:	syscall::pread:return):
invalid	kernel	access in	action #1	at DIF	offset 0
dtrace:	error	on enabled	probe ID 29	(ID 469:	syscall::pwrite:entry):
invalid	kernel	access in	action #1	at DIF	offset 0
dtrace:	error	on enabled	probe ID 29	(ID 469:	syscall::pwrite:entry):
invalid	kernel	access in	action #1	at DIF	offset 0
dtrace:	error	on enabled	probe ID 29	(ID 469:	syscall::pwrite:entry):
invalid	kernel	access in	action #1	at DIF	offset 0



# SIP is sometimes called “rootless” because the root user no longer has full access.



**Ask Different**  
Answers for your Apple questions

Home

Questions

Tags

Users

Unanswered

## What is the “rootless” feature in El Capitan, really?

▲ I have just learned about the "Rootless" feature in El Capitan, and I am hearing things like "There is no root user", "Nothing can modify `/System`" and "The world will end because we can't get root".

234

▼ What is the "Rootless" feature of El Capitan at a technical level? What does it actually mean for the user experience and the developer experience? Will `sudo -s` still work, and, if so, how will the experience of using a shell as `root` change?



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For me, it means DTrace no longer works.

91



DTrace is similar to `ptrace/strace` in Linux, in that it allows you to see what a process is saying to the kernel. Every time a process wants to open a file, write a file, or open a port, etc, it needs to ask the kernel. In Linux, this monitoring process happens outside of the kernel in "userland", and thus permissions are quite fine-grained. A user can monitor their own applications (to fix bugs, find memory leaks, etc) but would need to be root to monitor another user's process.

DTrace on OSX however works at the kernel level, making it much more performant and powerful, however it requires root access to add its probes into the kernel and thus do anything. A user cannot trace their own processes without being root, but as root they can not only watch their own processes, but in fact ALL processes on the system simultaneously. For example, you can watch a file (with `iosnoop`) and see which process reads it. This is one of the most useful features ever for detecting malware. Because the kernel also deals with network IO, the same is true there. Wireshark detects unusual network activity, DTrace tells you the process sending the data, even if its as embedded into the system as the kernel itself.

# T2 Chip & Pervasive Encryption

## Security

### Your data is safe

The Apple T2 Security Chip gives your Mac mini a higher-than-ever level of security. Your data is encrypted with keys tied specifically to your computer, and Secure Boot ensures that only legitimate macOS software loads at startup.

[Learn more about keeping your data safe](#)







# Apple Mail as full support for mail encryption

## **S/MIME — Add a public/private S/MIME key and Mail.app will:**

- Offer to sign outgoing mail.
- Offer to encrypt if it has the public key for the recipient

## **Transparent support for PGP is available with plug-in**

## **Encryption implementation is comprehensive**



# BlackBag had a great webinar on T2 and Physical Images



Hi Simson,

We recently announced that our Mac forensic tool, [MacQuisition](#), will be the **first and only solution** to produce a decrypted physical image of Apple's latest Mac systems utilizing the T2 chip.

# APFS



# APFS — Apple File System

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## **An advanced file system that supports:**

- Files and volumes from 1– $2^{63}$  bytes
- 64-bit file IDs
- 1 nanosecond time stamp granularity
- Cop-on-write
- Native encryption with per-file encryption keys
- Transparent support for SSD flash (erases after delete)

# APFS — Where you find it

---

## Internal drives:

- All new Apple devices
- All \*OS devices running current operating systems were upgraded.

## External drives:

- External drives were not automatically upgraded by macOS!
- If they were created before September 25, 2017:
  - Probably HFS+*
  - Possibly legacy FileVault*
- If they were created after September 25, 2017:
  - Either HFS+ or APFS*
  - May rely on the T2 chip*



# “Fusion drives”

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## Apple proprietary hybrid drive

SSD (24GB-128GB)

HD (1TB - 3TB)

## Managed by the OS, not by firmware

Appears as two drives

CoreStorage turns it into a single drive

## Reliability issues

Both hardware and software



# Unified Logging System



**ISSA**  
Information Systems Security Association  
**National Capital Chapter**



# Logfiles — Mac OS X El Capitan v10.11 and earlier

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## **Apple used traditional Unix logging.**

/var/log — directory where logs were stored

syslogd — System logging utility

newsyslog — log rotation

/etc/newsyslog.d/ — log rotation configuration

## **“man newsyslog”**

### **HISTORY**

The newsyslog utility originated from NetBSD and first appeared in FreeBSD 2.2.

### **AUTHORS**

Theodore Ts'o, MIT Project Athena

Copyright 1987, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

### **BUGS**

Does not yet automatically read the logs to find security breaches.

# Apple Unified Logging

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## **2014 — Apple introduced Activity Tracing, Faults & Errors**

Single logging mechanism for user & kernel mode

Efficient (better than a text file)


- Compresses data*
- Defers work and data collection*
- Manages log message lifecycle*
- Privacy designed into system — log messages not to contain PII*

## **Major improvements in logging:**

Categorization and filtering designed into collection & display



# Architecture



Profile can change routing and rules for given applications or subsystems

# Apple documentation

## Google NSLog...

→ NSLog()

— <https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation/1395275-nslog>

— “Simply calls NSLogv passing it a variable number of arguments.”

→ NSLogv

— <https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation/1395074-nslogv>

About 1,390,000 results (0.54 seconds)

### NSLog - Foundation | Apple Developer Documentation

<https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation/1395275-nslog> ▼

A global variable that can be used to enable debug behavior in your app, such as extra logging. `NSZombieEnabled`. A global variable related to zombie objects ...

#### People also search for

nslog swift    no matching function for call to 'nslog'  
nslog include    nslog header  
nslog object    nslog where is the output

Function

## NSLogv(\_:\_:)

Logs an error message to the Apple System Log facility.

## Declaration

```
func NSLogv(_ format: String,  
            _ args: CVarListPointer)
```

## Discussion

Logs an error message to the Apple System Log facility (see `man 3 asl`). If the `STDERR` `_FILENO` file descriptor has been redirected away from the default or is going to a tty, it will also be written there. If you want to direct output elsewhere, you need to use a custom logging facility.



# “man 3 os\_log”

---

os\_log(3)

BSD Library Functions Manual

os\_log(3)

## NAME

`os_log`, `os_log_info`, `os_log_debug`, `os_log_error`, `os_log_fault` -- log a message scoped by the current activity (if present)

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <os/log.h>
```

## DESCRIPTION

The unified logging system provides a single, efficient, high performance set of APIs for capturing log messages across all levels of the system. This unified system centralizes the storage of log data in memory and in a data store on disk. The system implements global settings that govern logging behavior and persistence, while at the same time providing fine-grained control during debugging via the `log(1)` command-line tool and through the use of custom logging configuration profiles. Log messages are viewed using the Console app in `/Applications/Utilities/` and the `log(1)` command-line tool. Logging and activity tracing are integrated to make problem diagnosis easier. If activity tracing is used while logging, related messages are automatically correlated.

# log(1) command line tool

---

## “man 1 log”

```
log(1)          BSD General Commands Manual
log(1)
```

### NAME

log -- Access system wide log messages created by os\_log, os\_trace and other logging systems.

### SYNOPSIS

```
log [command [options]]
```

```
log help [command]
```

```
log collect [--output path] [--start date/time] [--size num [k|m]] [--last num [m|h|d]]
```

```
log config [--reset | --status] [--mode mode(s)] [--subsystem name [--category name]] [--process pid]
```

```
log erase [--all] [--ttl]
```



# syslog -f reads the binary format

```
# ls -l
total 2208
-rw-----@ 1 root  171315 Apr  4 00:39 2019.04.03.G80.asl
-rw-----@ 1 root  210472 Apr  5 00:58 2019.04.04.G80.asl
-rw-----@ 1 root  392187 Apr  6 00:59 2019.04.05.G80.asl
...
# syslog -f 2019.04.03.G80.asl | head
NOTE:  Most system logs have moved to a new logging system.  See
log(1) for more information.
Apr  3 01:01:09 newdance com.apple.xpc.launchd[1]
(com.apple.imfoundation.IMRemoteURLConnectionAgent) <Warning>:
Unknown key for integer: _DirtyJetsamMemoryLimit
Apr  3 01:02:16 newdance syslogd[56] <Notice>: ASL Sender
Statistics
Apr  3 01:02:53 newdance com.apple.xpc.launchd[1]
(com.apple.imfoundation.IMRemoteURLConnectionAgent) <Warning>:
Unknown key for integer: _DirtyJetsamMemoryLimit
--- last message repeated 9 times ---
Apr  3 01:12:18 newdance syslogd[56] <Notice>: ASL Sender
Statistics
Apr  3 01:14:34 newdance com.apple.xpc.launchd[1]
(com.apple.imfoundation.IMRemoteURLConnectionAgent) <Warning>:
Unknown key for integer: _DirtyJetsamMemoryLimit
```

# Example of impact of private vs. public

```
override func viewDidLoad() {  
    super.viewDidLoad()  
    os_log("User %{PUBLIC}@ logged in",  
          log: OSLog.userFlow, type: .info, username)  
    os_log("User %{PRIVATE}@ logged in",  
          log: OSLog.userFlow, type: .info, username)  
}
```

## Viewed in XCode:

LogExample[7784:105423] [viewcycle] User Antoine logged in

LogExample[7784:105423] [viewcycle] User Antoine logged in

## Viewed in Console.app:

debug 18:58:40 +0100 LogExample User Antoine logged in


debug 18:58:40 +0100 LogExample User <private> logged in

—Source: <https://www.avanderlee.com/debugging/oslog-unified-logging/>



# Great write-up

<https://eclecticlight.co/2018/03/19/macOS-unified-log-1-why-what-and-how/>




## THE ECLECTIC LIGHT COMPANY

MACS, PAINTING, AND MORE

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hoakley / March 19, 2018 / [Macs](#), [Technology](#)

### macOS Unified log: 1 why, what and how



The diagram illustrates the flow of log data in macOS. It starts with 'code writes to log', which branches into two paths. One path goes through 'logd' (purple box), then 'compressor' (purple box), then 'buffer' (purple box), and finally to an 'in-memory store' (purple box). From the 'in-memory store', data is sent to three destinations: 'regular log file' (green box) pointing to '/var/db/diagnostics/Persist/\*.tracev3', 'Fault & Error log data' (green box) pointing to '/var/db/diagnostics/Special/\*.tracev3' and '/var/db/uidtext/...', and 'others', inc.' (green box) pointing to '/var/db/diagnostics/logdata.statistics.\*.txt'. A separate path from 'code writes to log' goes through 'diagnosticd' (yellow box) to a 'live' log stream' (pink box). A box labeled 'log file analysis, maintenance' (purple box) has arrows pointing to the three log file destinations.

When Apple released macOS Sierra 10.12 in September 2016, it brought one of the most fundamental changes since the first Public Beta of Mac OS X: it replaced classical Unix logs with a new unified log.

#### Quick Links

- [Downloads](#)
- [Mac problem-solving](#)
- [Extended attributes \(xattrs\)](#)
- [Painting topics](#)
- [Painting](#)
- [Life](#)
- [Language](#)

---

#### Search

---

Monthly archives


Follow

C FORENSICS 66

# Log tools from Electric Light Co

## Log Logger

### Regex search, export to CSV, flexible formatting



The screenshot shows the 'Save system log for period' dialog box. It features a yellow warning icon with a USB drive. The 'Filter' section has radio buttons for 'TimeMachine' (selected), 'none', 'Pattern', and 'other'. Below this, there are two identical filter rule sections. Each section has a 'Pattern' dropdown (set to 'none'), an 'Operator' dropdown (set to '=='), and a 'Text' input field (containing 'com.apple.TimeMachine'). A 'Logical' dropdown is set to 'AND'. Below these, an 'Other' text field contains the regex 'subsystem == "com.apple.TimeMachine"'. The 'Output style' section has radio buttons for 'syslog' (selected), 'default', and 'json'. There are two checked checkboxes: 'trim syslog output' and 'include info messages'. The 'Period (integer)' field is set to '4', and the 'Unit of time' has radio buttons for 's', 'm', 'h' (selected), and 'd'. Below this, there are two rows of date and time selection. The first row is for 'start date: YYYY-MM-DD' with '2016-11-07' and 'time HH:MM:SS' with '14:02:27'. The second row is for 'end date: YYYY-MM-DD' with '2016-11-07' and 'time HH:MM:SS' with '14:02:27'. There is a checked checkbox for 'open in editor'. The 'Additional options' section has a text field containing '--source --debug'. At the bottom right are 'Cancel' and 'OK' buttons.

**Save system log for period**

Filter: ☒ TimeMachine ☐ none ☐ Pattern ☐ other

Pattern: none Operator: == Text: com.apple.TimeMachine

Logical: AND

Pattern: none Operator: == Text: com.apple.TimeMachine

Other: subsystem == "com.apple.TimeMachine"

Output style: ☒ syslog ☐ default ☐ json

☒ trim syslog output

☒ include info messages

Period (integer): 4 Unit of time: ☐ s ☐ m ☒ h ☐ d

☒ start date: YYYY-MM-DD 2016-11-07 time HH:MM:SS 14:02:27

☒ end date: YYYY-MM-DD 2016-11-07 time HH:MM:SS 14:02:27

☒ open in editor

Additional options:

--source --debug

Cancel OK

<https://eclecticlight.co/downloads/>



# Consolidation

Untitled

Log source ☒ system ☐ file none selected Write logarchive Save as defaults

Filter ☐ Time Machine ☐ pattern ☐ other text

pattern none operator == text

logical AND

none ==

saved predicate none filter start

Style starters+ ☒ include info messages

final text --source&arg:--debug


Period 1 min or Start 2017-11-15 20:39:10 End 2017-11-15 20:40:10

Run command Export

["show", "--style", "json", "--info", "--last", "1m"]

```
2017-11-15 20:49:24.940129+0000 Info 4306381 10412 com.apple.cloudkit LogFacilityOP Tweetbot CloudKit Starting operation <private>
2017-11-15 20:49:24.940195+0000 Info 4305887 10412 com.apple.cloudkit LogFacilityOP Tweetbot CloudKit Starting operation <private>
2017-11-15 20:49:24.940885+0000 Default 4307249 503 cloudd CloudKitDaemon [Operation 0x7ff0becae160] Starting operation
2017-11-15 20:49:24.940919+0000 Info 4307249 503 com.apple.cloudkit LogFacilityOP cloudd CloudKitDaemon Starting <private>
2017-11-15 20:49:24.940923+0000 Default 4306366 503 cloudd CloudKitDaemon [Operation 0x7ff0bc6f3f00] Starting operation
2017-11-15 20:49:24.940961+0000 Info 4306366 503 com.apple.cloudkit LogFacilityOP cloudd CloudKitDaemon Starting <private>
2017-11-15 20:49:24.941384+0000 Default 4306367 503 cloudd CloudKitDaemon [Operation 0x7ff0be870e20] Starting operation
2017-11-15 20:49:24.941456+0000 Info 4306367 503 com.apple.cloudkit LogFacilityOP cloudd CloudKitDaemon Starting <private>
2017-11-15 20:49:24.941888+0000 Default 4306367 503 cloudd CloudKitDaemon [Operation 0x7ff0bc5f68c0] Starting operation
2017-11-15 20:49:24.941943+0000 Info 4306367 503 com.apple.cloudkit LogFacilityOP cloudd CloudKitDaemon Starting <private>
2017-11-15 20:49:24.943113+0000 Info 4306366 503 com.apple.cloudkit LogFacilityRequest cloudd CloudKitDaemon req: D8EED42B-87DA-4D55-8E9B-67BF47908066, "<private>:
Starting request with URL session data task <private>"
2017-11-15 20:49:24.943790+0000 Info 4306366 503 com.apple.cloudkit LogFacilityRequest cloudd CloudKitDaemon req: 81C6B6B4-7A6E-4170-A9D5-A404B7F4868D, "<private>:
Starting request with URL session data task <private>"
2017-11-15 20:49:24.949621+0000 Default 4307260 503 cloudd CFNetwork TIC TCP Conn Start [2160:0x7ff0beca9cd0]
2017-11-15 20:49:24.949654+0000 Info 4307260 503 com.apple.network cloudd libsystem_network.dylib nw_endpoint_handler_start [2160 p43-ckdatabase.icloud.com:443 initial path
(null)]
2017-11-15 20:49:24.949656+0000 Info 4307260 503 com.apple.network cloudd libsystem_network.dylib nw_connection_endpoint_report [2160 p43-ckdatabase.icloud.com:443 initial
path (null)] reported event path:start
2017-11-15 20:49:24.949740+0000 Info 4307260 503 com.apple.network cloudd libsystem_network.dylib nw_connection_endpoint_report [2160 p43-ckdatabase.icloud.com:443
in_progress resolver (satisfied)] reported event resolver:start_dns
```

# Consolation, RunConsolation, Blowhole, Woodpile, DispatchView, T2M2, and RunT2M2





# Mac Forensic Tools



Open Source  
Proprietary

# Built-in tools



# sysdiagnose(1)

## Used by Apple to generate system bug reports

“one-stop shopping for system diagnostics.”

—*ps(1)*, *zprint(1)*, and 60 (macOS) / 12 (iOS) other commands


## Also can be run from keychord:

MacOS: ⌘ ctrl ⌘ ⌘ .

iOS: Vol. Up + Vol. Down + Power

TvOS: Play/Pause + Vol. Down (5 seconds)

WatchOS: Digital Crown + Side Button (1 second)



```
1. sysdiagnose
[nimi ~ 05:51:01]$ sudo sysdiagnose
This tool generates files that allow Apple to investigate issues with your
computer and help improve Apple products. The files might contain personal
information found on your device or associated with your iCloud accounts,
including but not limited to your name, serial numbers of your device,
your device name, your attached peripheral devices, your user name, your
email address and email settings, file paths, file names, Siri suggestions,
your computer's IP addresses, and network connection information.

This information is used by Apple in accordance with its privacy policy
(www.apple.com/privacy) and is not shared with any other company. By using
this tool and sending the results to Apple, you consent to Apple using the
contents of these files to improve Apple products.

Press 'Enter' to continue. Ctrl+\ to cancel.

Progress:
[||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||70%|||||||||_____]
```

Output available at '/var/tmp/sysdiagnose\_2019.04.24\_05-51-06-0400\_Mac\_OS\_X\_Macmini8-1\_18E226.tar.gz'.

# Output is big:

---

```
Output available at '/var/tmp/
sysdiagnose_2019.04.24_05-51-06-0400_Mac_OS_X_Macmini8-1
_18E226.tar.gz'.
[nimi ~ 05:54:03]$ ls -l /var/tmp/
sysdiagnose_2019.04.24_05-51-06-0400_Mac_OS_X_Macmini8-1
_18E226.tar.gz
-rw-rw-r--  1 root  wheel  267205499  Apr 24  05:54  /var/
tmp/
sysdiagnose_2019.04.24_05-51-06-0400_Mac_OS_X_Macmini8-1
_18E226.tar.gz
[nimi ~ 05:56:23]$
```



# Output on my system: 1349 files!

---

```
128 Apr 24 05:57 Accessibility/
1649716 Apr 24 05:51 BluetoothTraceFile.pklg
262 Apr 24 05:52 DiskMountConditioner.json
160 Apr 24 05:57 Preferences/
256 Apr 24 05:57 SystemConfiguration/
928 Apr 24 05:57 SystemProfiler/
1056 Apr 24 05:57 WiFi/
101667 Apr 24 05:53 acdiagnose-501.txt
348 Apr 24 05:52 airport_info.txt
16271 Apr 24 05:53 apfs_stats.txt
412 Apr 24 05:52 applesdstats.txt
110509 Apr 24 05:53 apsd-status.txt
1237 Apr 24 05:52 bc_stats.txt
289 Apr 24 05:53 bless_info.txt
848 Apr 24 05:52 bootstamps.txt
512 Apr 24 05:57 brctl/
117379 Apr 24 05:53 ckkctl_status.txt
2556 Mar 2 14:48 com.apple.windowserver.plist
224 Apr 24 05:57 crashes_and_spins/
45 Apr 24 05:53 csrutil-status.txt
0 Apr 24 05:53 ctsctl-list-0.txt
```

# spindump(8)

**Collects detailed stats on all running programs.**  
**Shows where programs are running.**

```
Process:          1Password 7 [548]
UUID:            A3876C62-4FA9-3A7C-A1C3-64622AF89F27
Path:            /Applications/1Password 7.app/Contents/MacOS/1Password 7
Architecture:    x86_64
Parent:          launchd [1]
UID:             501
Footprint:       112.59 MB
Start time:      2019-04-24 06:07:45 -0400
End time:        2019-04-24 06:07:55 -0400
Num samples:     1001 (1-1001)
CPU Time:        0.003s (5.4M cycles, 1355.2K instructions, 4.01c/i)
Note:           2 idle work queue threads omitted
```

```
Thread 0x19fd          DispatchQueue 1          1001 samples (1-1001)
priority 46 (base 46)  cpu time 0.002s (5.0M cycles, 1257.0K instructions, 3.95c/
i)
  1001  start + 1 (libdyld.dylib + 91093) [0x7fff5b7d83d5]
    1001  NSApplicationMain + 777 (AppKit + 13296) [0x7fff2c9ce3f0]
      1001  -[NSApplication run] + 699 (AppKit + 81584) [0x7fff2c9deeb0]
        1001  -[NSApplication(NSEvent)
_nextEventMatchingEventMask:untilDate:inMode:dequeue:] + 1361 (AppKit + 105875)
[0x7fff2c9e4d93]
          1001  _DPSNextEvent + 965 (AppKit + 110587) [0x7fff2c9e5ffb]
            1001  _BlockUntilNextEventMatchingListInModeWithFilter + 64 (HIToolbox +
42150) [0x7fff2e64b4a6]
              1001  ReceiveNextEventCommon + 603 (HIToolbox + 42773) [0x7fff2e64b715]
```

# Open Source Tools



# Volatility!

**Original developed by Aaron Walters for his PhD thesis**  
**Now maintained by The Volatility Foundation**

## Key things to note:

- Volatility is a Python2.7 program.
- Volatility is also distributed as a “compiled” program.
- Volatility needs a “profile” for your kernel
- Creating a profile requires “debug” kernel.
- No debug kernel available for 10.14.3 yet.

Click here to  
make kernel  
build appear



# Some open source developers have created tools for parsing mac-specific data structures.

---

## **Apple Pattern of Life Lazy Output'er (APOLLO)**

<https://github.com/mac4n6/APOLLO>

## **MAC APT (Artifact Parsing Tool)**

[https://github.com/ydkhatri/mac\\_apt](https://github.com/ydkhatri/mac_apt)

## **OSX Auditor**

<https://github.com/jipegit/OSXAuditor>

## **OSXRipper**

<https://github.com/bolodev/osxripper>

## **iParser**

<http://az4n6.blogspot.co.uk/2012/08/automated-plist-parser.html>

<https://github.com/mdegrazia/iParser>

## **Mac Plist Ripper**

[https://bitbucket.org/chrishargreaves/mac\\_plist\\_ripper](https://bitbucket.org/chrishargreaves/mac_plist_ripper)

## **CCL Forensics BPlist parser**

<https://github.com/cclgrouppltd/ccl-bplist>

## **macmade/KeychainCracker.**

<https://github.com/macmade/KeychainCracker>


Most of these tools can be used on live systems or mounted disk images.

# Under macOS 10.14, parts of the file system are restricted from the user!

## If you see this:

```
[nimi ~ 18:37:07]$ ls -l ~/Library/Mail/  
ls: : Operation not permitted  
[nimi ~ 18:37:13]$
```

## You need to do this:





# mac\_apt — comprehensive macOS artifact parser

ydkhatri / mac\_apt

Watch

29

Star

149

Fork

23

<> Code

Issues 5

Pull requests 1

Projects 0

Wiki

Security

Insights

macOS Artifact Parsing Tool <https://swiftforensics.com>

dfir

forensics

macos

166 commits

2 branches

6 releases

4 contributors

MIT

Branch: master

New pull request

Find File

Clone or download

ydkhatri fixes plist read bug

Latest commit f46cd7d on Mar 19

Licenses	New plugins Bluetooth & Dockitems	7 months ago
lzfse_dll	Corrected typo in URL	9 months ago
plugins	fixes plist read bug	3 months ago
.gitignore	Fixed Notes 'table missing' bug for High Sierra	last year
AUTHORS.md	Update AUTHORS.md	4 months ago
CHANGES.txt	Version update to 0.3	last year
LICENSE.txt	Rename LICENSE to LICENSE.txt	2 years ago
README.md	Update README.md	4 months ago
mac_apt.py	Minor bug fix for volume only image	11 months ago
mac_apt_singleplugin.py	Test edit only	11 months ago
plugin.py	Fixed bugs with MOUNTED option, added more support for mounted disk p...	2 years ago


README.md

mac\_apt

# OSXRipper

[github.com/bolodev/osxripper](https://github.com/bolodev/osxripper)

**“OSXRipper is a tool to gather system and user information from OSX file systems. Currently it is supporting OSX versions 10.6 - 10.14 (Snow Leopard to Mojave).”**



# Commercial Tools





# Physical Acquisition

---

## Disk imaging:


- Built-in Unix commands (e.g. dd)
- Open-source Unix images (e.g. guymager)
- Commercial tools (e.g. Macquisition)
- T2-encrypted drives:
  - All can image the plaintext if you have the password.*
  - There is (currently) no way to decrypt a T2-encrypted image if it was imaged without the password.*

## Memory Imaging:

- Easiest way is to run macOS in a VM and suspend!
- Failing that, use a commercial tool.

# Blacklight is the leading forensics tool for MacOS.

It runs on Mac and Windows and analyzes everything.



## BLACKLIGHT®

BlackLight quickly analyzes computer volumes and mobile devices. It sheds light on user actions and now even includes analysis of memory images. BlackLight allows for easy searching, filtering and otherwise sifting through large data sets. It can logically acquire Android and iPhone/iPad devices, runs on Windows and Mac OS X, and can analyze data from all four major platforms within one interface. It's simply the best option available for smart, comprehensive analysis.



WINDOWS



ANDROID



IPHONE




MAC OS X

ADD TO CART

REQUEST TRIAL

REQUEST A QUOTE

RENEW



# MACQUISITION™

MacQuisition is a powerful, 3-in-1 solution for live data acquisition, targeted data collection, and forensic imaging. Tested and used by experienced examiners for over a decade, MacQuisition runs on the Mac OS X operating system and safely boots and acquires data from over 185 different Macintosh computer models in their native environment - even Fusion Drives. There's no need for complicated take-aparts when you've got MacQuisition.



MAC OS X


[ADD TO CART](#)
[REQUEST A QUOTE](#)
[RENEW](#)



[Census](#)
[VA](#)
[apps](#)
[\\$](#)
[news](#)
[doc](#)
[ref](#)
[Shop](#)
[Facebook](#)
[TTD](#)
[Jobs](#)
[My Prospects](#)
[Stats](#)
[GMU](#)
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[AWS](#)
[Yahoo](#)

[www.blackbagtech.com/software-products/softblock-494.html](#)


[This Connection Is Not Private](#)
[Software write blockers overview](#)
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**BlackBag**  
 TECHNOLOGIES

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# SOFTBLOCK™

SoftBlock™ is a software-based forensic write-blocking tool. SoftBlock quickly identifies newly attached hardware devices, and mounts the device with read-only or read-write permissions according to user preference. This forensic software is built to handle the needs of both large-scale digital forensic labs and individual forensic practitioners. SoftBlock allows forensic examiners to quickly and safely preview data contained on evidentiary devices before data is imported. SoftBlock is built to run on a forensic examiner's analysis machine; no additional expensive or cumbersome hardware is needed.

Note: The current version of SoftBlock (1.1.0) is compatible with OS X 10.9.5 - 10.13.3. SoftBlock 1.0.7 is compatible with OS X 10.7.x - 10.10.x. If you are running a version of OS X that is older than 10.7, you will need SoftBlock 1.0.5.



MAC OS X

ADD TO CART

REQUEST A QUOTE

# Elcomsoft Password Digger

**\$199. Runs on Windows; decrypts system and user keychains from MacOS computer**

## Elcomsoft Password Digger



Decrypt information stored in macOS (OS X) keychain and build a custom dictionary for password recovery tools in just a few clicks.

- Extract, decrypt and export the content of the system and all user keychains
- Build custom dictionaries with users' real passwords to improve password recovery attacks
- Use extracted Apple ID password to download iCloud backups (with Elcomsoft Phone Breaker)
- Save time compared to using Apple Keychain Access
- Export full keychain data into an unencrypted XML file

Supports: all versions of macOS up to and including the latest version; macOS (OS X) keychain, Wi-Fi passwords, Apple ID password, password to iTunes backups, AirPort and TimeCapsule passwords, passwords to Web sites and accounts, VPN, RDP, FTP and SSH passwords, passwords to mail accounts including Gmail and Microsoft Exchange, passwords to network shares, iWork document passwords

Standard Edition

\$ 199

 BUY NOW

Download free trial version

 Windows

# You must have a good dictionary for cracking modern encryption systems.

## Cracks:

keychain; Wi-Fi passwords; Apple ID passwords; iTunes backups; AirPort and TimeCapsul passwords; passwords to Web sites; VPN; RDP; FTP and SSH; passwords to mail accounts. iWork document passwords





# BlackBag: Apple iCloud Production Service

May 31, 2018

---

**“Have you worked with Apple on a legal process? Make sure you reveal all the data using our new #iCloud processing service. Once processed, bring together iCloud production sets, mobile devices & desktop images in BlackLight. 🔦 Learn more: <http://bit.ly/2NwG2en> #DFIR #Mac4n6**





How to Uncover Data in Apple iCloud Production Sets

537 views

👍 9    💬 1    ➦ SHARE    ≡+ SAVE    ...

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eU24GV7x1KQ>

# Blog on iCloud production

---

## **Apple responds to lawful and legal requests**

**Apple has a document on their website for assisting you in producing requests.**

## **Results may be encrypted and/or compressed**

Many organizations receiving iCloud productions don't know how to view it.  
85% of the data can be missed.

They can be imported directly into BlackLight.

**BlackBag provides complementary support to customers.**

**This data has been used by BlackLight  
in child exploitation cases.**

<https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/law-enforcement-guidelines-us.pdf>



# References



**ISSA**  
Information Systems Security Association  
**National Capital Chapter**

# Mac OS X Internals

A Systems Approach



AMIT SINGH

# Mac OS X Internals — A Systems Approach


Amit Singh, 2007 • 1632 pages. <http://osxbook.com>

---

## Key chapters:

- Open Firmware and Boot loader
  - [http://osxbook.com/book/bonus/ancient/whatismacosx/arch\\_boot.html](http://osxbook.com/book/bonus/ancient/whatismacosx/arch_boot.html)
  - [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BootX\\_\(Apple\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BootX_(Apple))
  - [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified\\_Extensible\\_Firmware\\_Interface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface)
- Kernel and User-Level Startup (180 pages)
- Processes (150 pages)
- Memory
- Interprocess Communication
- File Systems (HFS, ISO 9660, MS-DOS, NTFS, UDF, UFS, AFP, FTP, NFS, SMB/CIFS, WebDAV, cddaafs, deadfs, devfs, fdesc, specks and fifofs, synthfs, union, volfs)
- HFS+ File System (111 pages)





# \*OS Internals Volume I: User Space

Jonathan Levin • 515 pages • © 2017, 2018, 2019


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## **Starts where Mac OS X internal Stops**

- “Darwinism” — NeXTSTEP, MacOS, iOS, TvOS, WatchOS, eOS/BridgeOS, iDevice simulators
- Architecture of \*OS
- \*OS Filesystems
- UX and System Services — FSEvents, SpotLight, QuickLook, Duet, Printing, Siri, Voice Control, User Interface

## **Other chapters:**

- Application Services
- Mach-O File Format (Fat Binaries)
- dyld internals
- Processes, Threads and the Grand Dispatcher
- Memory
- CFRun - RunLoopRun: — Objective-C and Swift
- Mach IPC
- LaunchD
- Process Tracing and Debugging
- Networking





# \*OS Internals Volume III: Security & Insecurity

Jonathan Levin • 516 pages • © 2016, 2018

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
## Part I: Defensive Techniques

- Authentication
- Auditing
- Authorization - KAuth
- Mandatory Access Control Framework
- Code Signing
- Software Restrictions
- AppleMobileFileIntegrity
- Sandboxing
- System Integrity Protection
- Privacy
- Data Protection

## Part II: Vulnerabilities and Exploitation

- MacOS: Classic vulnerabilities
- iOS Jailbreaking
- evasi0n
- evasi0n 7
- Pangu Axe
- XuanYuan Sword
- TaiG
- Taig
- Pangu 9
- Pangu 9.3
- Pegasus
- Phoenix
- mach\_portal
- Yalu
- async\_wake

- MacOS Hardening Guide • Darwin 18 Changes



# Mor Resources

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## **Mac 4N6 Resources**

- <http://bit.ly/mac4n6s>

## **CFRS 768 Labs on Github**

- <https://github.com/simsong/cfrs764-spring2019>